The decisions taken at and after the Madrid Summit reflected strong support for EMU – more than was expected by some members of the Delors Committee. From the start of the subsequent negotiations, however, it was clear to all participants that the actual design of EMU would have to satisfy German concerns. The ECB would have to resemble the Bundesbank; it would have to be protected from political interference and dedicated to pursuing price stability. It was equally clear that there would be no “dash” to EMU. A long transition would be needed, as certain conditions would have to be met before the move to monetary union. These conditions came to be known as the convergence criteria (see Chapter 6).

Some economists criticized this gradual approach. They conceded that time would be needed to make technical preparations but not to await convergence. Their views echoed those of the so-called monetarists in the debates of the 1970s, who had argued that a quick move to monetary union would be a major regime change and would thus induce the changes in economic behavior required for convergence. Some critics also warned that a long transition could be hazardous, because shocks and accidents might disrupt the process. Those close to the negotiations tried to answer these objections. They argued, for example, that confidence in the permanence of EMU might be impaired if the economies of the participating countries did not converge sufficiently before their exchange rates were locked.