Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Hostname: page-component-77c89778f8-gvh9x Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-07-21T13:32:38.120Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

2 - Macroeconomic Theories and Their Political Implications

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 June 2012

William R. Keech
Affiliation:
University of North Carolina
Get access

Summary

An advantage of using the lens of macroeconomic issues through which to view democratic practice is that there is a large body of macroeconomic theory. This theory derives from the effort to understand the way the economic world works, to explain and predict, and to know what is possible and what is not. For better or worse, the unmistakable message of this chapter is that there is no single, uncontested theory of the way the macroeconomic world works. That means that political disagreement about economic issues is likely to involve differences of opinion and belief about what is realistic and feasible, as well as about what is desired. This chapter shows how macroeconomic theory is, in a sense, political theory.

POLITICAL ECONOMICS AND ECONOMIC THEORY: THREE QUESTIONS

Economic theory is the source of our most authoritative understanding of the way the macroeconomic world works, and there is an impressive body of such theory. As such, it seeks to identify what is possible; it seeks to identify the consequences of alternative courses of action; and it “defines the norms that determine when certain conditions are to be regarded as policy problems” (Majone, 1989, pp. 23–4). But macroeconomic theory does not speak with one voice. There are competing theories, deriving from competing systems of belief about the way the world works. We shall review a sequence of these theories with an eye to their answers to the following three questions:

Does the economy regulate itself?

The answer to this question is fundamentally important, because it has obvious implications for the roles of public officials and for the issue whether government should take an active or a passive stance toward economic stabilization.

Type
Chapter
Information
Economic Politics
The Costs of Democracy
, pp. 22 - 44
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 1995

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Save book to Kindle

To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure coreplatform@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

Available formats
×

Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

Available formats
×