Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- 1 Theoretical framework
- 2 Strategic-form analysis: theory
- 3 Strategic-form analysis: applications
- 4 Refinements of Nash equilibrium: theory
- 5 Refinements of Nash equilibrium: applications
- 6 Incomplete information: theory
- 7 Incomplete information: applications
- 8 Repeated interaction: theory
- 9 Repeated interaction: applications
- 10 Evolution and rationality
- 11 Learning to play
- 12 Social learning and equilibrium selection
- Bibliography
- Index
Bibliography
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 03 June 2010
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- 1 Theoretical framework
- 2 Strategic-form analysis: theory
- 3 Strategic-form analysis: applications
- 4 Refinements of Nash equilibrium: theory
- 5 Refinements of Nash equilibrium: applications
- 6 Incomplete information: theory
- 7 Incomplete information: applications
- 8 Repeated interaction: theory
- 9 Repeated interaction: applications
- 10 Evolution and rationality
- 11 Learning to play
- 12 Social learning and equilibrium selection
- Bibliography
- Index
Summary
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Economics and the Theory of Games , pp. 501 - 506Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2003