Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Hostname: page-component-77c89778f8-9q27g Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-07-16T14:28:55.998Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

13 - Regulation of Derivatives

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 May 2015

T. V. Somanathan
Affiliation:
The World Bank
Get access

Summary

… [A] man firing a rifle goes through the same motions whether he is aiming at a target on a rifle range, at a deer, or at a man across the street. And there apparently are some people who can shoot at a man with as little feeling as at a practice target. It is nevertheless profitable for society to distinguish among different uses of a rifle, and among different uses of risk-taking for monetary gain. Nor do we have any real difficulty in drawing these distinctions when we reject sophistry and apply common sense. We call a man an entrepreneur when he takes risks in a clearly useful type of business venture; a gambler when he takes risks of a nature that clearly serve no substantially useful economic purpose; and a speculator when he takes risks of another sort, that some people do not recognize as economically useful, though others regard them as highly useful.

Holbrook Working

Derivatives are (economic) tools and, like most tools, can be used as well as misused. In the most elementary sense, it is to prevent misuse – to prevent the use of the rifle to commit murder, in terms of Working's analogy – that a need arises for regulation.

Kahn, in his seminal work on the economics of regulation (largely in the context of public utilities) made the interesting point that ‘economics emerged in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries as an attempt to explain and to justify a market system’. Therefore, to classical economists, regulation would clearly represent an exception to standard economic prescriptions. Kahn regarded regulation as, in essence, the ‘explicit replacement of competition with governmental orders’ as a means of ensuring ‘good performance’.

Overall, economic theory suggests that regulation is justified in three kinds of situations:

  1. • to prevent serious distortions to competition and the abuse of monopoly power;

  2. • to protect ordinary people in circumstances where information is difficult or costly to obtain and mistakes could seriously affect their welfare; and

  3. • to compensate for externalities in situations where the social costs of market failure exceed the private costs after factoring in the costs of regulation.

Type
Chapter
Information
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2015

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Save book to Kindle

To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure coreplatform@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

Available formats
×

Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

Available formats
×