Introduction

Although the burgeoning discipline of welfare economics is based on essentially utilitarian principles, the foundations of utilitarianism have received little attention in recent years. This chapter seeks to reopen the debate by drawing a distinction between Harsanyi's (1977) two defenses of utilitarianism, which are referred to, respectively, as his teleological and nonteleological theories. It is argued that the modern consensus on political legitimacy requires a theory of the second type.

The organizational role of the state is seen as being to enforce laws that the people make for themselves under ideally fair circumstances. Harsanyi's nonteleological argument employs Rawls's devices of the original position to determine the nature of the ideally fair compromise and finds the result to be utilitarian. However, the Kantian principles to which both Harsanyi and Rawls appeal leave the vital question of how utilities are to be compared unresolved. This difficulty is seen as being symptomatic of a much deeper malaise in adopting a Kantian or metaphysical approach to the original position. This chapter therefore attempts to outline a new defense of the original position based on Humean or naturalistic considerations.

The original position is taken to be a stylized version of a fairness norm that evolved along with the human race. The empathetic preferences that are necessary as inputs when the device is employed are seen as being shaped by the forces of social evolution.