Chapter Three contrasts with two previous assertions about the Egyptian social contract: first, that it was established under Nasser, and second, that this social contract was largely the result of a new authoritarian bargain in which the state would boost allocations to citizens in return for political quiescence. Regarding the first assertion, the effendi social contract, at the centre of which was a rising demand for social justice – an increase in equality, opportunity and equity – was by then well established. Indeed, the main reason for the 1952 revolution was the broad consensus that there was a gap between this social contract and the political ability (or willingness) to follow through with it. From this perspective, I concur with Sara Salem's analysis that ‘Nasserism, formed in the early 1950s, was an instance of hegemony rather than domination’ and initially, at least, was more about consent than coercion because it would be based on a broad agreement regarding the required changes. As I discuss in this chapter and the next, the 1952 revolution did away with the old regime because that regime was accused of sluggishness in making the social contract happen, rather than because of a desire to replace the social contract. Regarding the second assertion, that the social contract was a top-down political dictate, or authoritarian bargain, I argue that this assertion is the result of reading history backward in time, as opposed to events unfolding from past to present. Nasser's regime did turn out to be authoritarian, but by then there was broad popular – read effendi middle class – support for state command of social affairs and economic development. Top-down and middle-up backing for the dominant state closely interacted.

Chapter Three outlines the continuity in Egypt's official, vertical social contract – as found in the state's constitution, as elaborated in the First Five Year Development Plan, and as culminated in the National Charter. As this chapter aims to establish, the Free Officers came to power on a wave of unprecedented effendi middle class expectation of social justice, regardless of the growing use of ‘the people’ or ‘the masses’ in official discourse.