This chapter examines the proposition that an fptp electoral system only produces a non-voter trade-off for Th ird Way social democrats, as it eff ectively constrains the electoral fortunes of those challengers that have been identifi ed as dangerous in the theoretical framework. The United Kingdom is used as a typical case on the basis that the Labour Party should face diff erent opportunities and constraints to engage in welfare state reforms compared to its continental sister parties, thanks to the British single-member plurality electoral system (e.g. Kitschelt 2001a; Randall & Sloam 2009). In this respect, Randall & Sloam (2009) have claimed that the adoption of Th ird Way agendas by social democratic parties and the political reforms under these agendas imply higher political costs for continental social democratic parties than for Labour. The same holds true for the electoral aftermath of those reforms, as the corresponding electoral dilemmas for the Labour Party should have a distinct character, as discussed in Chapter 2.

The Labour Party's transformation in the 1990s is often seen as the prototype of Third Way social democracy. In 1997, after 18 years in opposition, the Labour Party returned to power having undergone a process of ideological transformation, as indicated by the label ‘New Labour’. In office, the party's changed ideological position on social and economic policy became visible as New Labour implemented the ‘New Deal’ welfare state reforms, indicating a policy change from Labour's old social policy legacy (e.g. Shaw 2003, 2007; Clasen 2005).

On the other hand, Labour's only challengers were the existing competitors on the national level, the Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats. Neither did a serious challenger on the margins emerge after 1997. The most striking development was a decline in turnout of more than 10 percentage points under the aegis of Tony Blair, which fits the hypothesised effect of FPTP electoral systems for the electoral consequences of Third Way reforms. This chapter investigates the proposed effect of the unique electoral system; that is, an expected dealignment of Labour core voters into the non-voter camp.