Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Hostname: page-component-77c89778f8-fv566 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-07-20T22:17:16.900Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

8 - Deserving a Chance

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 June 2012

David Schmidtz
Affiliation:
University of Arizona
Get access

Summary

Thesis: There is more than one way to be deserving, and in particular, more than one way to deserve an opportunity. We sometimes deserve X on the basis of what we do after receiving X rather than what we do before.

HOW DO I DESERVE THIS?

Suppose we know what a person has to do to be deserving. Is there also a question about when a person has to do it? James Rachels says, “What people deserve always depends on what they have done in the past.” David Miller says, “desert judgments are justified on the basis of past and present facts about individuals, never on the basis of states of affairs to be created in the future.” Joel Feinberg says, “If a person is deserving of some sort of treatment, he must, necessarily, be so in virtue of some possessed characteristic or prior activity.”

If we are not careful, we could interpret such statements in a way that would overlook an important, perhaps the most important, kind of desert-making relation. It is conventional that what we deserve depends on what we do, and that we deserve no credit for what we do until we do it. There may be a further aspect to academic convention, though, namely that when we first receive (for example) our natural and positional advantages, if we have not already done something to deserve them, it is too late.

Type
Chapter
Information
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2006

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Save book to Kindle

To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure coreplatform@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

  • Deserving a Chance
  • David Schmidtz, University of Arizona
  • Book: The Elements of Justice
  • Online publication: 05 June 2012
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511817519.008
Available formats
×

Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

  • Deserving a Chance
  • David Schmidtz, University of Arizona
  • Book: The Elements of Justice
  • Online publication: 05 June 2012
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511817519.008
Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

  • Deserving a Chance
  • David Schmidtz, University of Arizona
  • Book: The Elements of Justice
  • Online publication: 05 June 2012
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511817519.008
Available formats
×