Naval Capability, Ministerial Reconstruction and the Admiralty, February–March 1742

As MPs left Parliament on 3 February 1742 they knew the political scene had shifted decisively and the war had been an important context for Walpole's fall. The overall result of the maritime war to date was inconclusive but this was, by common consensus, the fault of ministers and army officers. At the beginning of 1740 Spain had a very limited capability. During 1741 the naval balance of power had shifted towards Spain. However, France, even as a neutral, had significantly multiplied that shift of power and forced the redistribution of the British fleet into the Caribbean and Mediterranean. Lack of manpower was hindering deployments and the fleet was now geographically stretched. This was not noticed by the political public at this point and few doubted the capability of the navy, still less the practicability of the whole West Indian plan. Only the First Lord of the Admiralty, Sir Charles Wager, seems to have realised, by June 1741, that the ambitions for the reinforcements were, by then, unrealistic. Newcastle who dominated the ministry may have understood this, but was clear that the public assumption of success in the Caribbean was so powerful that it was vital to maintain the effort even with the limited resources available. The Spanish threat to Gibraltar and Minorca had been widened to the Italian coastline and it was difficult for Haddock to cover all these points. His numerical disadvantage compared to the Franco-Spanish squadrons had to be eliminated and towards the end of January 1742, four more ships of the line (an 80, 70 and two 60s) were sent to reinforce him. Manpower deficiencies for his enlarged squadron could only be met from the garrison of Port Mahon.2 From being primarily an offensive force in 1739/1740, with a focus on the Caribbean, the Royal Navy had, by the end of 1741, been forced to move to a more defensive posture with a Mediterranean focus and it was unclear how the maritime war could be developed to deliver the decisive blow against Spain in 1742.

The other aspect of the war at sea, the war against trade, had been equally disappointing.