The second most important aspect of the emotions is probably the appetitive aspect because, when present, and most emotions though not all seem to include this aspect, it will mirror and lead on from the evaluative aspect. For example, the fearful man's evaluation, ‘this is dangerous’, will lead on to a want or desire to avoid the danger or be rid of it. On the other hand the evaluation, ‘that was a grave loss or misfortune’, as forming part of sadness or grief, might not lead on to any desires. At any rate it is this aspect of emotions, the appetitive aspect, and why and when it is present in emotions, which I want to discuss here.

So, in detail, in this chapter I will argue:

1. (1) That some emotions contain an appetitive aspect;

2. (2) That the appetitive aspect is distinct from the evaluative but connected to it in two ways;

3. (3) That distinctions between emotions based on the evaluative aspect are reflected in the appetitive aspect;

4. (4) That there are distinctions between emotions directly related to the appetitive aspect.

That some emotions contain an appetitive aspect

That the concepts of some emotions entail the concepts of certain definite types of desires is suggested by the fact that some emotions are among those things that are put forward not merely as a motive in the sense of cause of an action but also as a motive in the sense of explanation, not merely for an action but for a particular sort of action.