Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Hostname: page-component-7bb8b95d7b-s9k8s Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-09-17T21:49:45.138Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

Practitioner Comment on Consumer Law Enforcement in Europe

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  22 December 2020

Get access

Summary

The VW emission scandal has demonstrated deficits in the enforcement of European consumer rights in practice. While VW customers in other parts of the world, in particular the US, have been compensated within a relatively short time after it became public that Volkswagen AG (VW) had installed illegal defeat devices in 11 million vehicles worldwide, including 8 million vehicles in Europe, many of the affected European consumers are still waiting for redress.

The initial setup in the VW emission scandal is exemplary for big mass tort cases worldwide: On the one hand there is VW, a multinational corporation, the largest car manufacturer in the world. On the other hand, millions of deceived consumers. It is in the nature of things that there is no level playing field (Section I.). While there are mechanisms to even the playing field between corporations and consumers, the legal system in Europe perpetuates the disadvantages of consumers (Section II.). The consequence is that many European consumers refrain from enforcing their rights (Section III.). To overcome this so-called ‘rational disinterest’ in the VW emission scandal in Europe, claim bundling models have emerged in praxis and the legislator has started to act (Section IV.). As long as there is no real group litigation mechanism for redress, stipulated on a European level, however, consumers in Europe remain in a disadvantaged position.

THE INITIAL SETUP: NO LEVEL PLAYING FIELD

The initial setup in the VW emission scandal is the typical constellation ‘repeat player versus one shotter’ which the American law professor Marc Galanter had already described in the year 1974. He characterised the repeat player as ‘a unit which has had and anticipates repeated litigation, which has low stakes in the outcome of any one case, and which has the resources to pursue its long-run interests’. The one shotter, on the other hand, ‘a unit whose claims are too large (relative to his size) or too small (relative to the cost of remedies) to be managed routinely and rationally’, deals with the legal system only rarely.

The structural predominance of the repeat player VW over the deceived consumers, each on his or her own a one shotter, is self-evident. The repeat player has numerous advantages from the outset: advance intelligence, expertise and access to specialists.

Type
Chapter
Information
Enforcing Consumer and Capital Markets Law
The Diesel Emissions Scandal
, pp. 427 - 438
Publisher: Intersentia
Print publication year: 2020

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Save book to Kindle

To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure coreplatform@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

Available formats
×

Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

Available formats
×