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11 - Human Beings

Christopher Belshaw
Affiliation:
Open University
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Summary

An argument of this book has been that our concern for the environment, even if not straightforwardly a concern for human beings, is nevertheless a concern expressed by human beings, and one that appropriately takes the welfare of human beings as among its central focuses. This leaves several questions unanswered. Some can be addressed here.

A world without people

Could there be reason to destroy, or wish for the destruction of, the human race? Many environmentalists believe that there could. We consign animals to lives of misery, cut down ancient forests, exterminate species on a massive scale and generally trash the planet. It would be better off without us. But this can be meant in one of two ways. In the first, human beings are so wretched, and do such wretched things, that a world containing them is of net disvalue overall. So even if a world without people cannot have value, still, that valueless world would be better than this. In the second, the world without people can have value, but whatever that value is, people make it worse, leaving it with a lesser positive value, or no value either way, or again net disvalue overall. Either way, they make the world a worse place than it would otherwise be. And that is why, according to some, they have to go.

Is it plausible to hold that an unpeopled world must be of neutral value? It surely isn't plausible to hold this.

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Publisher: Acumen Publishing
Print publication year: 2001

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  • Human Beings
  • Christopher Belshaw, Open University
  • Book: Environmental Philosophy
  • Online publication: 05 February 2013
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/UPO9781844653263.012
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  • Human Beings
  • Christopher Belshaw, Open University
  • Book: Environmental Philosophy
  • Online publication: 05 February 2013
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/UPO9781844653263.012
Available formats
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Save book to Google Drive

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  • Human Beings
  • Christopher Belshaw, Open University
  • Book: Environmental Philosophy
  • Online publication: 05 February 2013
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/UPO9781844653263.012
Available formats
×