I have wanted to argue that there are no compelling grounds for supposing that plants, like animals, are of direct moral concern. If there were no grounds at all, and sentience were a condition of something's being directly morally considerable, then it would follow that other non-sentient things were similarly not of such concern. But what I wanted to suggest towards the close of Chapter 6 is that there might still be some reasons, even if these be less than irresistible, for thinking that certain sorts of wrongs, under certain sorts of conditions, can be delivered to a wide range of entities. And so, although there is, I believe, an important line at sentience, it is still too early to conclude that beyond sentience we can do simply as we will. In this chapter, then, I want to consider several of the claims made for extending the area of moral concern some way beyond the boundary of life, to include non-living entities of various different kinds. I will begin with one seemingly obvious extension, towards certain particular things which, although themselves not alive, are just as much a part of the natural world as living things.

Rivers

A river, provided it is not too seriously polluted, will typically contain many living things. Even so it mainly comprises water, which although supportive of life is not itself alive. A river here is in many ways like a mountain, a lake or a desert.