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Barnes, J., Bobzien, S., and Mignucci, M. 1999. “Logic,” in Algra et al. (1999) 77–176.CrossRef

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Curd, P. “Why Democritus Was Not a Skeptic,” in Essays in Ancient Greek Philosophy, Vol. 6: Before Plato, A. Preus, ed. Binghamton: State University of New York Press, 149–169.

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Diels, H. and Kranz, W. 1985. Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker. Zurich: Weidmann.Google Scholar

Dorandi, T. 1999. “Chronology,” in Algra et al. (1999) 31–54.CrossRef

Englert, W. 1987. Epicurus on the Swerve and Voluntary Action. American Classical Studies, 16. Atlanta: Scholar's Press.Google Scholar

Everson, S. 1999. “Epicurean Psychology,” in Algra et al. (1999) 542–559.CrossRef

Fischer, J. 2002. “Frankfurt‐type Examples and Semi‐Compatibilism,” in Kane (2002) 281–308.

Fischer, J., and Ravizza, M. 1998. Responsibility and Control. A Theory of Moral Responsibility. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Frankfurt, H. 1969. “Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility.” Journal of Philosophy 66, 829–839.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Fowler, D. 2002. Lucretius on Atomic Motion: A Commentary on De rerum natura 2.1–332. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Frede, M. 1980. “The Original Notion of Cause,” in Barnes et al. (1980) 217–249.

Furley, D. 1967. Two Studies in the Greek Atomists. Princeton: Princeton University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Furley, D.1989a. “Aristotle and the Atomists on Motion in a Void,” in Cosmic Problems. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 77–90.

Furley, D.1989b. “Weight and Motion in Democritus' Theory,” in Cosmic Problems. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 91–102.

Furley, D.1994. “Self‐Movers,” in Gill and Lennox (1994) 3–14.

Ganson, T. 1999. “Democritus against Reducing Sensible Qualities.” Ancient Philosophy 19, 201–215.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Gaskin, R. 1995. The Sea Battle and the Master Argument: Aristotle and Diodorus Cronus on the Metaphysics of the Future. Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Gill, L., and Lennox, J. eds. 1994. Self‐Motion: From Aristotle to Newton. Princeton: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar

Haji, I. 2002. “Compatibilist Views of Freedom and Responsibility,” in Kane (2002) 202–28.

Hankinson, R. J. 1995. The Sceptics. London and New York: Routledge.Google Scholar

Hankinson, R. J.1996. “Cicero's Rope,” in Algra, K., Horst, P., and Runia, D., eds., Polyhistor: Studies in the History and Historiography of Ancient Philosophy. Leiden: E. J. Brill, 185–205.CrossRef

Hankinson, R. J. 1998. Cause and Explanation in Ancient Greek Thought. Oxford: Clarendon Press.Google Scholar

Heil, J. 1992. The Nature of True Minds. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Hicks, R. D. 1962. Stoic and Epicurean. New York: Russell and Russell Inc.Google Scholar

Hintikka, J. 1973. Time and Necessity. Studies in Aristotle's Theory of Modality. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar

Hocutt, M. 1974. “Aristotle's Four Becauses.” Philosophy 49, 385–399.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Huby, P. 1967. “The First Discovery of the Freewill Problem.” Philosophy 42, 353–362.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Inwood, B., and Gerson, L. P. 1997. Hellenistic Philosophy: Introductory Readings. Second edition. Indianapolis: Hackett.Google Scholar

James, W. 1890. The Principles of Psychology, Volume One. Authorized Edition, 1950. New York: Dover Publications.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Kane, R. 1996. The Significance of Free Will. New York: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar

Kane, R.ed. 2002. The Oxford Handbook of Free Will. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar

Kapitan, T. 2002. “A Master Argument for Incompatibilism?” in Kane (2002) 127–157.

Kim, J. 1989. “The Myth of Nonreductive Materialism.” Presidential address, Central Division, Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association, 43, 3: 31–48. (anthologized in R. Warner and T. Szubka, eds., 1994. The Mind–Body Problem, Oxford: Blackwell, 242–260.)

Kirk, G. S., Raven, J. E., and Schofield, M. 1983. The Presocratic Philosophers. Second Edition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar

Kirwen, C. 1989. Augustine. London: Routledge.Google Scholar

Laursen, S. 1987. “Epicurus On Nature Book xxv.” Cronache Ercolanesi 17, 77–78.Google Scholar

Laursen, S. 1988. “Epicurus On Nature Book xxv: Long‐Sedley 20 b, c, and j.” Cronarche Ercolanesi 18, 7–18.Google Scholar

Llewelyn, J. E. 1966. “The Inconceivability of Pessimistic Determinism.” Analysis 27, 39–44.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Long, A. A. 1986. Hellenistic Philosophy: Stoics, Epicureans, Sceptics. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press.Google Scholar

Long, A. A., and Sedley, D. 1987. The Hellenistic Philosophers. 2 vols. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar

Macdonald, S. 1999. “Primal Sin,” in The Augustinian Tradition, Matthews, G., ed. Berkeley: University of California Press, 110–139.Google Scholar

Mackie, J. L. 1982. The Miracle of Theism. Oxford: Clarendon Press.Google Scholar

Malcolm, N. 1968. “The Conceivability of Mechanism.” Philosophical Review 77, 45–72.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Mann, W. 2001. “Augustine on Evil and Original Sin,” in The Cambridge Companion to Augustine. Stump, Eleonose and Kretzmann, Norman, eds. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 40–48.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Mansfeld, J. 1999. “Sources,” in Algra et al. (1999), 1–30.

McPherran, M. 1987. “Skeptical Homeopathy and Self‐Refutation.” Phronesis 32, 290–328.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Mitsis, P. 1988. Epicurus' Ethical Theory: The Pleasures of Invulnerability. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.Google Scholar

O'Brien, D. 1981. Theories of Weight in the Ancient World: Four Essays on Democritus, Plato and Aristotle. A Study in the Development of Ideas. Volume One: Democritus, Weight and Size: An Exercise in the Reconstruction of Early Greek Philosophy. Paris: Les Belles Lettres.

O'Keefe, T. 1996. “Does Epicurus Need the Swerve as an Archê of Collisions?” Phronesis 41, 305–317.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

O'Keefe, T. 1997. “The Ontological Status of Sensible Qualities for Democritus and Epicurus.” Ancient Philosophy 17, 119–134.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

O'Keefe, T. 2001 a. “Would a Society of Wise Epicureans Be Just?” Ancient Philosophy 21, 133–146.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

O'Keefe, T. 2001 b. “Is Epicurean Friendship Altruistic?” Apeiron 34, 269–305.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

O'Keefe, T. 2002. “The Reductionist and Compatibilist Argument of Epicurus' On Nature Book 25.” Phronesis 47, 153–186.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

O'Keefe, T. 2003 a. Review of Fowler (2002). Ancient Philosophy 23, 461–468.CrossRef

O'Keefe, T. 2003 b. “Lucretius on the Cycle of Life and the Fear of Death.” Apeiron 36, 43–65.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

O'Keefe, T.2003c. Review of Warren (2002). Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, May 2003. <http://ndpr.icaap.org/content/archives/2003/5/okeefe/warren.html>

Pereboom, D. 2001. Living Without Free Will. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Prior, A. 1967. Past, Present and Future. Oxford: Clarendon Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Purinton, J. 1996. “Epicurus on the degrees of responsibility of ‘things begotten’ for their actions: a new reading of On Naturexxv,” in G. Giannantoni and M. Gigante, eds., Epicureismo Greco e Romano: Atti del Congresso Internazionale Napoli, 19–26 maggio 1993, vol. i. Naples, 155–168.

Purinton, J. 1999. “Epicurus on ‘Free Volition’ and the Atomic Swerve.” Phronesis 44, 253–299.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Rackham, H., trans. 1931. Cicero: De Finibus Bonorum et Malorum. Second edition. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press (Loeb Classical Library).Google Scholar

Rackham, H.,trans. 1942. Cicero: De Oratore III, De Fato, Paradoxa Stoicorum, De Partitione Oratoria. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press (Loeb Classical Library).Google Scholar

Rescher, N. 1963. “An Interpretation of Aristotle's Doctrine of Future Contingency and Excluded Middle,” in Rescher, N., Studies in the History of Arabic Logic. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 43–54.Google Scholar

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