In the previous chapter, I proposed an account of what it is about us that makes us moral equals. Now, with that account in hand, I want to return to the distributive questions that are my main concern. In the current chapter, I will argue, first, that the same considerations that account for our moral equality also tell for the equal distribution of a certain (rather abstract) good among us, and, second, that achieving this form of distributive equality means accepting many of the inequalities that stem from differences in the parties’ choices. By integrating equality and choice in this way, we will both complete the monistic turn that Dworkin's discussion began and put ourselves in a position to resolve many further distributive questions.

I

It is widely believed that the ultimate justification for any set of social arrangements is that they advance the interests of those who live under them. This is of course only a necessary condition, since even a universally beneficial set of arrangements will not be justified if it distributes the relevant benefits and burdens sufficiently unfairly (or, perhaps, if its rationale is not in some sense available or acceptable to all affected parties); but it is widely viewed as true as far as it goes. Although the condition's acceptance may not be quite universal – some organicists may believe, instead, that societies or states have independent moral standing, and that their interests have more weight than those of some or even all combinations of individuals – I will, in what follows, simply assume that it is correct. I will assume, as well, that although each state's institutions affect many who live beyond its borders, the persons whose interests are primarily relevant to their justification include only those who do or will fall under its dominion.