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  3. Ethical Subjectivism and Expressivism
  • Cited by 15
Publisher:
Cambridge University Press
Online publication date:
August 2020
Print publication year:
2020
Online ISBN:
9781108581134
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108581134
Series:
Elements in Ethics
Subjects:
Philosophy: General Interest, Ethics, Philosophy
Information

Book description

Ethical subjectivists hold that moral judgements are descriptions of our attitudes. Expressivists hold that they are expressions of our attitudes. These views cook with the same ingredients – the natural world, and our reactions to it – and have similar attractions. This Element assesses each of them by considering whether they can accommodate three central features of moral practice: the practicality of moral judgements, the phenomenon of moral disagreement, and the mind-independence of some moral truths. In the process, several different versions of subjectivism are distinguished (simple, communal, idealising, and normative) and key expressivist notions such as 'moral attitudes' and 'expression' are examined. Different meanings of 'subjective' and 'relative' are examined and it is considered whether subjectivism and expressivism make ethics 'subjective' or 'relative' in each of these senses.

References

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