Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Hostname: page-component-84b7d79bbc-tsvsl Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-07-27T16:38:23.664Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

4 - Frog and Toad Lose Control (co-authored with Jeanette Kennett)

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  04 December 2009

Michael Smith
Affiliation:
Princeton University, New Jersey
Get access

Summary

“You know, Toad,” said Frog with his mouth full, “I think we should stop eating. We will soon be sick.” …

“Frog,” said Toad, “let us eat one very last cookie, and then we will stop.” Frog and Toad ate one very last cookie.

“We must stop eating!” cried Toad as he ate another.

“Yes,” said Frog, reaching for a cookie, “we need will power.”

“What is will power?” asked Toad.

“Will power is trying hard not to do something that you really want to do,” said Frog.

(Arnold Lobel, Frog and Toad Together, 32–35)

Frog's final remark is more than just a little puzzling. It seems to be a truism that whenever we do something – and so, given the omnipresence of trying (Hornsby 1980), whenever we try to do something – we want to do that thing more than we want to do anything else we can do (Davidson 1970). However, according to Frog, when we have will power we are able to try not to do something that we “really want to do.” In context the idea is clearly meant to be that what we really want to do and what we most want to do are one and the same. But how is this meant to be so much as possible? It seems to require that our desire not to do what we most want to do is both our strongest desire and not our strongest desire. And that is a blatant contradiction.

Type
Chapter
Information
Ethics and the A Priori
Selected Essays on Moral Psychology and Meta-Ethics
, pp. 73 - 83
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2004

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Brandt, R. B. 1988: “The structure of virtue,” in P. A. French et al., eds., Midwest Studies in Philosophy Volume XIII. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press
Davidson, D. 1963: “Actions, Reasons and Causes,” reprinted in his Essays on Actions and Events. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1980
Davidson, D. 1970: “How Is Weakness of the Will Possible?,” reprinted in his Essays on Actions and Events. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1980
Davidson, D. 1971: “Agency,” reprinted in his Essays on Actions and Events. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1980
Hornsby, J. 1980: Actions. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul
Kennett, J., and M. Smith 1994: “Philosophy and Commonsense: The Case of Weakness of Will,” in M. Michael and J. O'Leary-Hawthorne, eds., Philosophy in Mind. Dordrecht: Kluwer Press
Lobel, A. 1971: Frog and Toad Together. New York: Scholastic
Mele, A. 1987: Irrationality: An Essay on “Akrasia,” Self-Deception, and Self-Control. New York: Oxford University Press
Pettit, P., and Smith, M. 1990: “Backgrounding Desire,” Philosophical Review 99: 565–92CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Pettit, P., and Smith, M. 1993a: “Practical Unreason,” Mind 102: 53–79CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Pettit, P., and M. Smith 1993b: “Brandt on self-control,” in Brad Hooker, ed., Rationality, Rules and Utility. Boulder, CO: Westview Press
Smith, M. 1992: “Valuing: Desiring or Believing?,” in D. Charles and K. Lennon, eds., Reduction, Explanation, Realism. Oxford: Oxford University Press
Smith, M. 1994: The Moral Problem. Oxford: Basil Blackwell
Smith, M. 1995: “Internal Reasons,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 55: 109–31CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Save book to Kindle

To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure coreplatform@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

Available formats
×

Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

Available formats
×