INTENTIONS, PURPOSES AND PLANS OF ACTION

In this chapter, the ethical theory implied by the arguments of Chapters 2 and 3 is spelled out in greater detail and additional objections to it addressed. In the process, a comparison is made between the theory and certain features of Kantian ethics. The theory that emerges from the reasoning of Chapters 2 and 3 has some revealing similarities to Kantian approaches to ethics, I argue, but some equally revealing differences. Important moral issues are explored in the light of this comparison, including the need for a distinction between ideal and non-ideal ethical theory. I begin by addressing some questions left unanswered in Chapters 2 and 3 about the role of the moral sphere and its breakdown, questions that will lead to the main themes of the chapter.

The retreatants chose to treat others with openness up to a point where the moral sphere has broken down. But is it always clear when this point has been reached? Is it always clear when, or whether, the moral sphere has broken down and who is the guilty party when it does? These questions were not fully addressed in Chapters 2 and 3, where the examples of moral sphere breakdown were simple ones in which the guilty parties were easily identified (assailants, Gestapo, pirates, persecuting neighbors). Starting with simpler cases before moving on to complex ones is not uncommon in ethical discussion.