There are a number of different types of conclusions that can be drawn from this study and that will be elaborated upon in this last chapter. The EC/EU's positions on the conflict have naturally evolved over the decades, but there have been both a clear path-dependency and normative power attached to them. Once new terminology was introduced, it often remained and often became real policies. Other actors often followed and adopted the EU's positions, or were at least influenced by them. The Israeli–Arab conflict has indeed been much more important than other conflicts for the EU because of the four reasons outlined in the introduction: (1) the conflict has been central to the formation of the EU's foreign policy; (2) the conflict has had a persistent unique place in the EU's foreign policy; (3) the EU's involvement in the conflict has been based on major strategic factors; and (4) the EU has for a long time been part of the conflict. But whereas these arguments were true for several decades, basically up until the early 2010s, it is clear today that several of them no longer apply or need to be revised. Moreover, there are a number of additional conclusions that can be drawn from this study: the EU has tremendous potential leverage in the conflict, but the biggest rhetoric–reality gap has been between the EU's repeatedly stated willingness to use all of its power to reach a solution in the conflict and the reality of this never happening. Another interesting conclusion is what this book has called the EU's more Palestinian-critical/less Israeli-critical approach, which began during the 2000s and is still ongoing.

The Policy Departures

This book has specifically focused on the policy departures of the EU in the conflict since 1967 – when, how, and why they took place.