The aim of this book was to examine EU prospectus law and shed fresh light on regulatory competition in the field of EU securities regulation by engaging in a more meaningful manner with EU decision-making. In this spirit, the chapters looked for insight and inspiration to the political science literature and, in this process, departed from law and economics, the conventional lens for interdisciplinary studies in the regulatory competition or the securities regulation literature. The result was a series of chapters with often distinctive positive orientations. This concluding chapter draws the final lessons and ends, in a conciliatory tone with convention, on a normative note.

Two lessons can be learned from previous chapters. The first lesson concerns the need to come to grips with the nuts and bolts of EU decision-making in the securities regulation field. Securities regulation is now the product of a multi-level system of governance. EU institutions are the main force shaping the regulatory framework governing regulated markets, while collective securities actors, such as ESMA, testify to a ‘European way’ of dealing with regulation and supervision within a constitutional and political setting that is preventing the establishment of an autonomous, single European securities markets authority. Endless discussions about whether Europe would be better off with an independent EU securities regulator which would have its place along other EU institutions, have in my opinion little added value, at least as long as they ignore the reality of EU decision-making and Treaty change.