Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Hostname: page-component-5c6d5d7d68-pkt8n Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-08-16T02:46:36.000Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

3 - (Maximum) harmonisation

from PART II - Prospectus disclosure regulation

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 June 2011

Pierre Schammo
Affiliation:
University of Manchester
Get access

Summary

Introduction

Among the FSAP directives in the financial markets field, it is perhaps the Prospectus Directive (‘PD’) that is most often associated with the concept of maximum harmonisation, the most ambitious form of harmonisation. Paradoxically, however, the directive does not explicitly pin down the basis of the maximum harmonisation regime. It is more readily apparent in the PD's implementing legislation, the Level 2 Prospectus Regulation (‘PR’) that requires a person, who wishes to make a public offer or seek admission to trading on a regulated market, to comply with specific and detailed disclosure requirements. These disclosure requirements – or information items – form the core of a first prospectus disclosure model, a maximum harmonisation model, which is meant to ensure a level playing field and ultimately contribute to the EU's integrationist ambitions. The EU, as opposed to the Member States acting individually, emerges as the main actor, or the main force, shaping this disclosure model. The purpose of this chapter is to examine the harmonised content of this regime (or model) and the various obligations that relate to it. In the maze of rules and requirements, it identifies three core obligations on which the regime is built: (i) the obligation to draw up a prospectus in accordance with the rules of the PD and PR, (ii) the obligation to seek approval of the prospectus with the competent authorities of the issuer's home Member State, and (iii) the obligation to publish the prospectus and comply with the PD's and PR's rules and principles governing advertisement.

Type
Chapter
Information
EU Prospectus Law
New Perspectives on Regulatory Competition in Securities Markets
, pp. 69 - 141
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2011

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Save book to Kindle

To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure coreplatform@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

Available formats
×

Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

Available formats
×