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Conclusion to Part IV Needed: A New European Union?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 January 2010

John Gillingham
Affiliation:
University of Missouri, St Louis
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Summary

The history of European integration in the 1990s might lead one to such a conclusion. The process was not a driver of change but a drag on it, causing Europe to miss some of the opportunities of the decade and stifling many others. The source of the problem was not passivity or inactivity but rather a misplaced policy of “deepening,” “positive integration,” and institution building. The European Union deferred overdue reform and created bigger problems than any it might have solved. The botching of Enlargement is the worst mistake in the history of integration; it has discredited European idealism and will yield a harvest of future problems. The way out of the EU's difficulties is not to scrap it – or even for any single nation to walk out – but to learn from the mistakes of the 1990s.

Innovation was the decade's great story, and Silicon Valley was its symbol. Digital technology was a liberating force of such strength that one must reach back centuries to find apt comparison. It moved the spirit as well as the economy, rehabilitated the word “progress,” and created a common denominator of human interest, value, and achievement. The high-tech revolution threatened the status quo everywhere yet improved the odds that change would be peaceful and constructive. The decade provided ample evidence of progress. China and India began to make their weight felt in the world. The American economy boomed, as did industry and agriculture almost everywhere outside of sub-Saharan Africa and (until the end of the decade) the Russian “near abroad.” Contrary to fears and expectations, the collapse of the Soviet Union did not sweep in revolution, civil war, or chaos; bloodshed was, with certain painful exceptions like Chechnya, sporadic rather than endemic.

Type
Chapter
Information
European Integration, 1950–2003
Superstate or New Market Economy?
, pp. 480 - 486
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2003

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