Introduction

The effects of the Marshall Plan on Germany's economic miracle are still controversial. On the one hand, public opinion and traditional economic history in Germany have it that the Marshall Plan marked the beginning of Germany's fabulous post-war recovery. On the other hand, an influential school among German economic historians maintains that post-war reconstruction both in Germany and throughout Europe was largely independent of the Marshall Plan; see Janossy (1966), Manz (1968), Abelshauser (1975, 1981). In this view, both the late beginning and small magnitude of ERP deliveries to Germany provide evidence of the Marshall Plan having been irrelevant for Germany's post-war growth. Rather, the multitude of catching-up possibilities open to Germany and all other countries of continental Europe is held to have accounted for the golden fifties. The fact that supergrowth prevailed almost everywhere in Europe is taken as evidence against a major role for economic policies or even the choice between central planning and more liberal economic systems.

Defenders of the Marshall Plan have found it difficult to cope with this phenomenon of uniform growth. Most typically, the Marshall Plan is viewed as a series of nationwide aid and recovery schemes that can be analyzed independently. Thus, case studies are often presented which seek to pinpoint examples of Marshall aid having helped to overcome strategic bottlenecks in a given national economy.