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8 - On Probatory Ostension and Inference

from Part III - On Evidential Inferences

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 May 2022

By
Giovanni Tuzet
Edited by
Jordi Ferrer Beltrán  and
Carmen Vázquez
Jordi Ferrer Beltrán
Affiliation:
Universitat de Girona
Carmen Vázquez
Affiliation:
Universitat de Girona
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Summary

This contribution discusses two theses on juridical evidence: the ostension thesis and the inference thesis. According to the former, the process of juridical proof typically requires some kind of ostensive act. In this sense, the evidence consists of some kind of element susceptible of being shown, or exhibited, or indicated to someone in a given context. According to the second thesis, the process of juridical proof necessarily requires inference. In this process, juridical evidence becomes the content of one or more inferences performed by the parties or by the fact-finders (judges or jurors). It can be the content of a premise which, together with other premises, leads to a conclusion about the disputed facts; or the content of a conclusion to which the premises lead. The two theses concern the process of juridical proof, but also the evidence involved in the process, since some characters of the process affect its content. Evidence is ostensively shown and inferentially processed.

Keywords

Legal evidenceinferenceostensionproof
Type
Chapter
Information
Evidential Legal Reasoning
Crossing Civil Law and Common Law Traditions
 , pp. 138 - 158
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2022

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