This chapter examines, in turn, what we learn from this argument about the missile crisis, about what political judgement and is and how it is best explained, and how the argument develops theory in political science.

Implications for understanding the October crisis

The empirical chapters have argued that the neo-Durkheimian account can help to explain puzzles about the Cuban missile crisis that remain inadequately explained by other theories.

Firstly, it makes better sense of judgement style in the Kremlin than other theories. In particular, it offers a more integrated explanation of the series of Khrushchev’s decisions from the deployment through to improvising in the crisis week, the instability of his issue linkages, and the forces shaping his coping, opportunistic approach. Understanding isolate ordering in the Kremlin makes sense of his willingness to bear risks in some circumstances but to show caution in others. The zero-sum view of prestige in isolate order makes good sense of the the choice of Cuba as the venue for a large gamble. Secondly, it explains both Castro’s decisions to accept the missiles, to call upon Khrushchev to attack the US mainland at the height of the crisis, and to do everything he could to obstruct the agreement.

Although each makes important contributions, none of the Allison and Zelikow (1999 [1971]) models really performs well in explaining Khrushchev’s deployment decision. Allison and Zelikow make few efforts to try to apply models II (organisational routine) or III (internal bargaining) to Khrushchev’s decision to deploy. They sometimes lean towards the ‘Berlin’ hypothesis, but we have seen few reasons to think that Khrushchev had a thought-through issue-linkage strategy.