The sense of crisis that engulfed Ulster loyalism and Unionism in November 1985 was more intense than that of 1974. Then, the Council of Ireland was the bugbear that effectively brought the Sunningdale Agreement down, through fear of southern influence in Northern Ireland affairs; now, the Anglo-Irish Agreement (AIA) formalised southern influence on northern governance, and unlike 1974 there were no established institutions in Northern Ireland at which loyalists could vent their anger and opposition, the meetings of the Agreement being a moveable feast that could be held at any designated location in northern or southern Ireland, or Britain. Signed by Margaret Thatcher and Garret FitzGerald, the Irish Taoiseach, on 15 November 1985, at Hillsborough Castle, county Down, it was an international treaty between the United Kingdom and the Irish Republic, and a multidimensional response to the Ulster problem premised on the understanding that the involvement of both States was an essential basis for any solution, their mutual engagement covering political, legal, economic, social, cultural, constitutional and security cooperation. As such, the Agreement was not intended as a solution to the Ulster problem but, with Unionist anxieties in mind, an instrument for addressing nationalist grievances and by doing so compel Unionists to negotiate one, the preferred solution being centred on a form of restored powersharing Government at Stormont. Until such a Government emerged, however, the Irish Government represented the interests of the Catholic community, its role in the governance of the north facilitated by a secretariat of Irish civil servants at Maryfield, outside Belfast. Most worrying for Unionists, not only did the absence of settled institutions in Northern Ireland make the Agreement difficult to oppose, but the element of Irish Republic ‘influence’ in the governance of Northern Ireland was ambiguous – at what point would it be instrumental or marginal in any given situation? Accordingly, both Unionism and loyalist paramilitarism united in the wake of its announcement. David Kerr, a leading Ulster NF member reflected loyalist paranoia when he claimed that even ‘the isolated Whites in Black inner cities have … more security than border loyalists’. Westminster had betrayed Ulster and the Queen had not lifted a hand to help Ulster loyalists. The AIA would provide the context of Northern Ireland politics until the Belfast/ Good Friday Agreement of 1998.