So far we have discussed the social groups that actively joined the fascist movement. Such an elaboration is misleading, in Tuscany above all, if it conveys the impression that a large proportion of the population supported the fasci. In the Tuscan countryside, as we have sought to emphasize, the reaction relied for its success on the gathering of a restricted and socially heterogeneous following whose only unifying features were anti-socialism and the defence of relative privilege. That such a movement, combining as it did the material resources of the most powerful men in the region with an aroused popular base, should have become an important political force is perhaps readily comprehensible. What requires further explanation is that such a force should have risen to power, and in so brief a compass. There is a yawning gap between the early fascist expansion and the first fascist successes in the winter and spring of 1921 on the one hand and, on the other hand, the nearly complete victory of the squads over their opponents by the autumn and the conquest of state power a year later. Unaided and unabetted, the fascist movement could not have accomplished such a feat.

To understand the fascist victory then, we must go beyond an examination of the social composition of the movement to study other powerful forces that remained formally outside the movement but contributed vitally to its success. We have seen the close relationship that developed between the fasci and the élites of the land of Tuscan industry and of the Church. In addition, the fascist movement succeeded because it was able to mobilize the resources of the state. In this chapter we shall examine the collusion of the public authorities.