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Introduction

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 November 2011

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Summary

This part identifies and evaluates the constraints that determine the options (opportunity sets) available to decision makers within the Commission. These constraints are imposed on the Commission by external forces within the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of government. (The Commission's organizational structure, personnel policies, and operating procedures also affect the options of FTC officials and are discussed in Chapter 15.)

The legislative branch potentially exerts power over the Commission by controlling its budget, changing its statutory authority, and applying pressure via oversight and other ad hoc monitoring. Chapters 2 and 3 examine the Commission's statutory authority and its relationship with Congress. The courts review most major FTC actions and, consequently, could limit the Commission's power under the broad language of the FTC Act. Chapter 4 considers this judicial constraint. Next, Chapter 5 discusses the relation of other parts of government to the FTC. The President appoints the commissioners and designates the chairman, the Office of Management and Budget has the final word on the FTC budget before it is submitted to Congress, the Civil Service Commission (recently changed to the Office of Personnel Management) has authority over many FTC employees, and several other agencies either directly or indirectly affect the Commission.

To define these constraints, we examined statutes, cases, hearings, and various other documents. Although these sources were useful, we did not confine ourselves to them. We extensively interviewed present and former government officials from both inside and outside the FTC.

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The Federal Trade Commission since 1970
Economic Regulation and Bureaucratic Behavior
, pp. 11 - 12
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 1981

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