Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Hostname: page-component-788cddb947-rnj55 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-10-19T11:03:47.818Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

Conclusion

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  26 December 2009

Get access

Summary

Trust is diverse both in value and location. As a relational good, it calls attention to the attributes of truster and trusted. It may be understood as a precondition of human cooperation and a distinct policy available in specific circumstances. Trust may be inspired by the speaker or the speech, by character or action; as a feature of public institutions whose rules are open to alteration, trust may be construed as an artifact, a device that human beings can control and adjust to changing needs and demands. Trust may be a conditional value, justifying praise only on specific occasions, or it may express an unqualified trustworthiness signifying fidelity or mutual faithfulness. Love, an exclusive loyalty or affection, may make trust blind; equally, trust can attract trust in return. Hobbes takes an uncompromising view of these ambiguities and equivocations. To the man who thinks himself confident of the trustworthiness of others, he asks “what opinion he has of his fellow-subjects, when he rides armed; of his fellow citizens, when he locks his doors; and of his children, and servants, when he locks his chests. Does he not there as much accuse mankind by his actions, as I do by my words?”

But Hobbes's starting point is too severe and can only generate further mutual misapprehension and fear. It is true, of course, that human societies sometimes disintegrate to the point where mutual trust is impossible and citizens face each other as potential enemies.

Type
Chapter
Information
Frames of Deceit , pp. 166 - 173
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 1992

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Save book to Kindle

To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure coreplatform@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

  • Conclusion
  • Peter Johnson
  • Book: Frames of Deceit
  • Online publication: 26 December 2009
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511625374.008
Available formats
×

Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

  • Conclusion
  • Peter Johnson
  • Book: Frames of Deceit
  • Online publication: 26 December 2009
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511625374.008
Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

  • Conclusion
  • Peter Johnson
  • Book: Frames of Deceit
  • Online publication: 26 December 2009
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511625374.008
Available formats
×