Introduction

In Chapter 5 we saw the unsatisfactory character of disputing the truth of premise 2 of the determinist argument, the premise stating that actions are a kind of event, by urging, simply, that actions differed from events because actions brought with them notions of responsibility in ways in which event-descriptions did not. Another, more standard, way of attempting to deny the truth of premise 2 of that argument is sometimes called “compatibilism” or “reconciliationism” or even “soft determinism”. None of these names is entirely happy, since each suggests only some aspect of the position named, rather than getting to its heart. Here is one place our characterization of determinism can seem important: theorists who think universal causation is compatible with action (for instance, Dennett 1984; Fischer 1994) have sometimes called themselves determinists, but of some special kind: say, soft determinists. In my view, they are free will defenders since, for them, the determinist's conclusion does not follow from his or her first premise alone. And the standard names have all been associated with some particular theorist's view. So I prefer a neutral name, and hence call this the “two-language” view.

The burden of this position is the logical independence of two ways of describing and explaining occurrences (the “language” of causes and the “language” of action) so that no statement in the “language” of causes can entail a statement of choice. This undermines premise 2 of the determinist argument since what the determinist means by the term “event” (in effect, explained in premise 1 of his or her argument) involves event-description being essentially causal.