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  3. Game-Theoretic Models of Bargaining
  • Cited by 70
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    • Publisher:
      Cambridge University Press
      Publication date:
      23 September 2009
      29 November 1985
      ISBN:
      9780511528309
      9780521267571
      9780521022743
      DOI:
      https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511528309
      Dimensions:
      (228 x 152 mm)
      Weight & Pages:
      0.704kg, 404 Pages
      Dimensions:
      (228 x 152 mm)
      Weight & Pages:
      0.591kg, 404 Pages
      • Subjects:
      Economics, Microeconomics, Econometrics and Mathematical Methods
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    Subjects:
    Economics, Microeconomics, Econometrics and Mathematical Methods
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    Book description

    Game-Theoretic Models of Bargaining provides a comprehensive picture of the new developments in bargaining theory. It especially shows the way the use of axiomatic models has been complemented by the new results derived from strategic models. The papers in this volume are edited versions of those given at a conference on Game Theoretic Models of Bargaining held at the University of Pittsburgh. There are two distinct reasons why the study of bargaining is of fundamental importance in economics. The first is that many aspects of economic activity are directly influenced by bargaining between and among individuals, firms, and nations. The second is that bargaining occupies an important place in economic theory, since the 'pure bargaining problem' is at the opposite pole of economic phenomena from the case of 'perfect competition'. This volume is an outgrowth of the renewed interest in the strategic approach to the theory of bargaining and to the general theory of non-cooperative games.

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