Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Hostname: page-component-77c89778f8-5wvtr Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-07-21T22:21:34.487Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

Second Subdivision of the Logic: The Doctrine of Essence §§ 112–159

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  30 September 2021

Klaus Brinkmann
Affiliation:
Boston University
Daniel O. Dahlstrom
Affiliation:
Boston University
Get access

Summary

§112

The essence is the concept insofar as it is simply posited; in the essence, the determinations are only relative, they are not yet fully reflected in themselves. For this reason, the concept is not yet for itself. As being that mediates itself with itself in virtue of its negativity, essence is relation to itself only insofar as it is relation to an other that is, however, not immediately a being, but something posited and mediated. – Being has not disappeared; instead, in the first place, the essence, as a simple relation to itself, is being; in the second place, moreover, in keeping with being's one-sided determination as something immediate, being has been demoted to something merely negative, to a shine [Scheine]. – The essence is accordingly being as shining in itself [Scheinen in sich selbst].

The absolute is essence. – This definition is the same as the definition that it is being, insofar as being is also the simple relation to itself; but at the same time it is higher since the essence is being that has gone into itself, that is to say, its simple relation to itself is this relation, posited as the negation of the negative, as mediation of itself in itself with itself. – However, when the absolute is determined as essence, negativity is frequently taken only in the sense of an abstraction from all determinate predicates. This negative act, the abstracting, then falls outside of the essence and the essence itself is thus only a result without these, its premises, the caput mortuum of abstraction. But since this negativity is not external to being, but instead is its own dialectic, then its truth, the essence, is the being that has gone into itself or is in itself; that reflection, its process of shining in itself, constitutes its difference from immediate being and is the distinctive determination of the essence itself.

Addition. Any talk of essence entails distinguishing it from being as immediate and considering the latter as a mere semblance in regard to the essence. This semblance, however, is not by any means denied; it is not nothing, but is instead being as sublated.

Type
Chapter
Information
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2010

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Save book to Kindle

To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure coreplatform@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

Available formats
×

Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

Available formats
×