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2 - The Broken Middle

from Part 1 - Speculative Philosophy

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 August 2013

Kate Schick
Affiliation:
Victoria University of Wellington
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Summary

This chapter deepens our understanding of speculative philosophy: it applies Rose's speculative Hegelianism to her conception of the broken middle and explores its outworking, in response to the brokenness of modernity. Whereas in Chapter 1, Hegel Contra Sociology was the focus of exegesis, in this chapter, The Broken Middle: Out of Our Ancient Society is the central focus. In this, Rose's most challenging work, she deepens her critique of old (liberal) and new (postmodern) philosophy: the old, for its prescription and progressivism, and the new, for its rejection of the struggle to know and to judge. Both of these approaches refuse to do the difficult work of the middle: they avoid the anxiety associated with the brokenness of modernity. Drawing on Hegel's speculative thought, Rose asserts the need for philosophy's ‘grey in grey’: a ‘grey in grey’ that contrasts with the ‘colour on colour’ of postmodernity, with its exuberant rejection of traditional philosophy. She continues:

Philosophy's ‘grey in grey’ was never intended to damage its endeavour: to keep it quiescent, modestly contemplative, servile or resigned. This subtle array, this grey in grey, would turn hubris not into humility but into motile configuration. Grey in grey warns against philosophy's pride of Sollen, against any proscription or prescription, any imposition of ideals, imaginary communities or ‘progressive narrations’. Instead, the ‘idealizations’ of philosophy would acknowledge and recognize actuality and not force or fantasize it. They act as the third, the middle, their own effectivity at stake between the potentiality and actuality of the world and engaging at the point where the two come into a changed relation: not ex post facto justification, even less a priori rejuvenation, but reconfiguration, oppositional yet vital – something understood.

Type
Chapter
Information
Gillian Rose
A Good Enough Justice
, pp. 36 - 54
Publisher: Edinburgh University Press
Print publication year: 2012

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