This chapter examines egalitarian approaches to global distributive justice. Whereas the minimalist accounts we shall examine in chapter 3 set their sights relatively low in aiming to secure a decent minimum for all (although this could still be a very challenging objective in practice), egalitarian accounts are less easily satisfied. Even if everyone’s basic needs were met, they would still offer reasons to be uneasy about the inequalities which might remain. In fact, we could object to global inequalities for a wide range of reasons, and different egalitarian theories will pick out different reasons on which to focus. But one important point to bear in mind from the outset is that egalitarian approaches to global justice will tell us that some inequalities are unfair or unjust in their own right. Other theories – such as the minimalist theories we shall examine in chapter 3 – could suggest that we have instrumental reasons for objecting to some global inequalities. Perhaps inequalities, if they become too wide, could stand in the way of other things that we value, such as the ability of nations to be self-determining, or to co-operate on fair terms. But pointing to such instrumental reasons would not make such theories egalitarian in themselves. Egalitarian theories are distinctive because they suggest that inequalities would matter even if they did not prevent us from achieving self-determination or fair co-operation for example. As such egalitarian positions on global justice will be more demanding, and less easily satisfied, than minimalist ones.

Section 2.1 of this chapter provides some brief empirical information about key global inequalities and their trends over time. It also examines what we mean by global inequalities – with most global egalitarians expressing concern about inequalities between individuals rather than inequalities between nation states. Section 2.2 moves on to discuss one of the first and most important arguments for a broadly egalitarian position on global justice, that of Charles Beitz. We examine his argument that the distribution of natural resources is ‘arbitrary’ and should be remedied by a ‘resource redistribution principle’, and we also examine the case he makes for a global ‘difference principle’. Section 2.3 moves on to address the work of Simon Caney, another significant global egalitarian theorist. Again we sketch the contours of his account and pay particular attention to his argument for another global egalitarian principle: the principle of ‘global equality of opportunity’. Section 2.4 then shifts our attention to a somewhat different issue. The various chapters of this book are principally engaged in examining the rivalry between global egalitarianism and global minimalism as opposing approaches to global distributive justice, and assessing their implications across a range of political issues. However, the literature on global justice also abounds with references to ‘cosmopolitanism’ and ‘cosmopolitan justice’. It is often assumed that the major division is between ‘cosmopolitans’ and ‘statists’, and this could leave the reader somewhat puzzled. Section 2.4 examines the relationship between statism and cosmopolitanism, on the one hand, and global egalitarianism and minimalism on the other. Ultimately it suggests that the distinction between statism and cosmopolitanism is potentially misleading in a number of ways, whereas the language of global egalitarianism and minimalism is more useful for our purposes. But readers who are already comfortable with the language of global egalitarianism and minimalism, and who remain un-puzzled by the language of statism and cosmopolitanism, may prefer to skip this final section.