Having said that much, it is now time to ask one more essential question: are all these analyses and conclusions correct, and especially are the forecasts reasonable, if they happen to have been wrong so many times in the recent postsocialist past? The answer consists of three parts. First, there were many warnings and predictions that accurately were pointing to the risks and to the future unpleasant occurrences, yet they had not been taken sufficiently into account by the policymakers, including international organizations. Second, theoretical assumptions that the transition countries can become fast-growing economies have been correct, nonetheless the conditions for such a take-off were not fulfilled at the time, due, among other things, to policy failures. And third, now is a time to presume rationally that such conditions can be met, so that growth can accelerate as well. However, there are differences and there are also risks.

One difference between then and now is that now we suppose we know much better than earlier what works in postsocialist economies, and why, and what does not work, and why. Although, there has been the false assumption that unleashed market forces will themselves do the development job. They will not. For this reason, the governments’ sound development strategies and wise involvement of the international community, including official and non-government organizations, must support the market forces. Hence, the first risk is that such involvement can be insufficient or guided by wrong economic theory.

A second difference between then and now is that at the onset of new century all these transition economies are already growing. So the question is not any more how to stop recession and depression, but how to accelerate the rate of growth and sustain it at the highest possible level for the longest possible period. All the time there is a challenge how to do it within the framework of specific institutional and political environments of na-scent postsocialist market and democracy. A negligence of this enduring specificity creates the second risk.

Policies exercised during the first decade of transition have, to a large extent, been derived from the so-called Washington consensus, although this set of structural reforms was designed for another challenge (Williamson 1990 and 1997). Yet while applied towards postsocialist economies, these policies have greatly influenced the direction of systemic reforms and the course of change (Stiglitz 1998a). However, the transition has also had a significant counter-impact.