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17 - Effective investment governance in defined contribution schemes

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 July 2011

Dietrich Hauptmeier
Affiliation:
DCisions
Graham Mannion
Affiliation:
DCisions
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Summary

DC pensions are guided consumer products

Effective investment governance in defined contribution (DC) schemes needs to start with a clear understanding of the members’ role and responsibilities within the investment process.

When DC pension plans were first introduced, there may have been an expectation (or at least a hope) that employees would act as the rational consumers of classical economic theory, making optimal saving and investment decisions in accordance with their personal preferences, and thereby doing effectively everything that the professionals had previously done for them in defined benefit (DB) pension schemes.

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Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2011

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References

Benartzi, S.Thaler, R.How Much Is Investor Autonomy Worth? 2002 57 Journal of Finance1593CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Benartzi, S.Thaler, R.Naïve Diversification Strategies in Retirement Savings Plans 2001 91 Alcuin, Epistola 111, p. 160.79Google Scholar
MacFarland, D. M.Marconi, C. D.Utkus, S. P.Mitchell, O. S.Utkus, S. P.Pension Design and Structure: New Lessons from Behavioural FinanceOxfordOxford University Press 2002Google Scholar
Thaler, R. H.Sunstein, C. R.Nudge: Improving Decisions about Health, Wealth, and HappinessNew Haven, CTYale University Press 2008Google Scholar
Choi, J.Laibson, D.Madrian, B. C.Metrick, A.Optimal Defaults and Active Decisions 2003 93 American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings180CrossRefGoogle Scholar

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