Yeltsin's political defensiveness and his search for means to recoup lost authority were decisive determinants of the fact and timing of his decision to invade Chechnya. By late 1994 – with his personal approval ratings plummeting, the economy in a precarious state after the crash of the ruble on October 11,1994, a hostile (albeit less powerful) Duma, charges of corruption swirling around his government, powerful centrifugal forces still asserting themselves in the regions of Russia, Western assistance and investment at a small fraction of earlier expectations, integration into Western institutions proceeding at a snail's pace, and NATO expansion on the table – Yeltsin found himself severely challenged to justify the quality of his leadership. He was very much on the defensive politically, even though he had secured popular ratification of a Constitution that, formally at least, largely shielded him from threats of impeachment or legislative vetoes of his decrees. Moreover, already in 1995, “election season” would begin in anticipation of parliamentary elections scheduled for December 1995 and presidential elections scheduled for June 1996.

It was in this context that Yeltsin tackled the Chechnya problem. His first State of the Federation address, in February 1994, was significantly entitled “The Strengthening of the Russian State.” A treaty relationship was struck with Tatarstan in February 1994 that gave that region within Russia an exceptional level of autonomy, far more than that accorded regions within Switzerland, Spain's Catalonia, or states within the United States. But the president of Chechnya would not accept the same terms; he insisted on independence from Russia and on pursuing policies that threatened Russia's internal security.