More than anything else, the success of the concept of Europeanisation in recent years is due to the realisation that EU policy has become domestic policy, with 80 per cent of all policy sectors influenced in one way or another by the Union. Such processes might better be described as ‘EUisation’, in so far as they refer to the impact of the institutions, actors and policies of the European Union on its member states. But most scholars prefer to reason in terms of Europeanisation and to avoid the unattractive phraseology of the alternative term (Börzel 2002; Featherstone and Radaelli 2004; Bulmer and Lequesne 2005). Among the various definitions of Europeanisation, a distinction is usually drawn between top-down and bottom-up processes. For Saurugger (2007) top-down Europeanisation can best be understood as a continuum at three levels: adaptation, inertia and resistance. Adaptation of preferences to the perceived requirements of integration is the strongest form of Europeanisation. There has been a proliferation of work looking at the domestic effects of European integration on political (typically executive) structures and on public policies. Inertia signifies the absence of any causal relationship between European-level and domestic change (Börzel 2002). Paradigmatic policy change, or changing relations between the state and non-state actors, for example, might have nothing to do with EU-level processes. Rejection is much stronger. Social movement and party actors use an anti-EU discourse to shape their own strategies, while policy-makers resist unwelcome developments in European integration by all means at their disposal.