Introduction

Contained in the quote above is a principle inherent to the contractarian tradition, whereby constitutions numerate the rights individuals must grant one another if they want to socially cooperate under an order of universal positive law. In this regard, the modern constitution becomes the instantiation of cooperative moral law. The modern constitution translates moral law to positive law, which is meant to both reflect the beliefs of individual participants, but also to secure these individual freedoms by a commitment to equal and universal obligation. However, implicitly lurking within the quote is a conception of universal justice. In other words, these rights are mutually granted to individuals on some formulated understanding of social cooperation and this understanding rests on a conception of justice. Furthermore, in order to formulate how benefits and burdens are to be fairly allocated in connection to a conception of social cooperation we would also need to understand which normative principles this distribution is ultimately concerned to protect. The question would have to be asked by any participating member; who should have rights, who should have duties, and who owes what to whom? It would seem that John Rawls located this contractarian concern correctly when he suggested that, “the first virtue of a scheme of social cooperation is a mutually agreed conception of justice.”