Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Tables and Figures
- Acknowledgements
- A Note on Transliteration
- Glossary
- Introduction
- Part I Family, Students and Friends: From Dyadic to Transnational Networks
- Part II Charitable Politics: Benevolent Patrons, Beneficiaries and the State
- Part III The Affairs of the State: Clerical Participation in Politics
- Conclusion
- Notes
- Bibliography
- Index
Part III - The Affairs of the State: Clerical Participation in Politics
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 August 2016
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Tables and Figures
- Acknowledgements
- A Note on Transliteration
- Glossary
- Introduction
- Part I Family, Students and Friends: From Dyadic to Transnational Networks
- Part II Charitable Politics: Benevolent Patrons, Beneficiaries and the State
- Part III The Affairs of the State: Clerical Participation in Politics
- Conclusion
- Notes
- Bibliography
- Index
Summary
Introduction
The political potential of Shi'i ‘ulama’ is an infinite source of debate. Given the de jure illegitimacy of temporal authorities in the absence of the Twelfth Imam, how do the ‘ulama’ relate to the state? Are they always a source of opposition? Is their opposition necessarily revolutionary, let alone with the end objective of establishing an Islamic state under their rule? If clerical involvement in politics is not aimed at changing the political system itself or at claiming executive power, what is its purpose and under what conditions is it deemed to be appropriate? Alternatively, what are the motivations of the ‘ulama’ who shun politics and how should aloofness be interpreted?
In tackling these questions, the literature has usefully clarified the diversity of clerical approaches to the state, and thereby pointed to the lack of a unified Shi'i political theory. The history of Shi'ism, from the time of the Imams onwards, has not been predominantly one of rebellion against temporal authorities, but rather of acceptance. The Iranian ‘ulama’, the object of intense academic scrutiny after 1979, both supported and opposed the Safavid, Qajar and Pahlavi dynasties. Specifically with regard to the long revolutionary era, Khomeini's militancy from the early 1960s was not representative of the attitude of the whole religious establishment. Moreover, his model of Islamic government was never commonly accepted, neither in its theoretical formulation when first exposed in Najaf in 1970, nor in its practical implementation within the Islamic Republic after the revolution.
Recognition of these conflicting clerical attitudes has led to attempts at classification. Most common is the distinction between activism and quietism. With Khomeini regarded as the quintessential embodiment of the former attitude, activism generally entails the idea of rebellion for the sake of establishing an Islamic state. The type of governance envisioned for that state is often assumed to be a replication of the Iranian model, though there are ‘ulama’ who actively seek to bring about an Islamic order yet not under clerical rule; or, if they do assign executive power to the religious leadership, their models are by no means similar.4 In contrast, quietism is equated with aloofness from the mundane world of politics, with the implication of an accommodation with the existing order.
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- Information
- Guardians of Shi'ismSacred Authority and Transnational Family Networks, pp. 119 - 122Publisher: Edinburgh University PressPrint publication year: 2015