The Al-Hakim Foundation opened its doors in Najaf in 2004. Headed by 'Ammar al-Hakim, this organisation established, in less than a decade, more than five hundred educational, cultural and humanitarian centres throughout Iraq, as well as three international offices in New York, Geneva and Beirut.

Engagement in charitable work is hardly a new characteristic of the leadership roles assumed by al-Hakim family members. For decades, it has been an integral, yet little-known, aspect of their fame. This philanthropic record is worthy of attention to illustrate the gains patronage providers may seek to obtain in terms of social and political status. In Iraq, as discussed in this chapter, but also in other countries, Muhsin al-Hakim had the responsibility as a marja’ to reallocate the religious tithes he received from believers. The propagation of Islam being a central purpose of khums, he showed special concern for the development of religious and educational projects, in addition to the provision of basic social services to the people most in need. In so doing, he aimed to uphold or revive communal religiosity in order to bring the Shi'a closer to the religious leadership.

If the sons of Muhsin al-Hakim who built their leadership in exile are most renowned for their political activities against the Iraqi regime, they also played the role of patronage providers. Mahdi al-Hakim organised the religious and social affairs of co-religionists in Pakistan and afterwards in the UAE, while the mission of his World Ahl al-Bayt Islamic League in London was to promote the advancement of Shi'i communities worldwide. Moreover, the religious, educational and social services provided by the al-Hakim-led SCIRI/ISCI to Iraqis in both the pre- and post-2003 eras exemplify how the charitable work of a political organisation is a function closely linked to its fundamental mission.

A Marja’ Reconnecting with Iraqi Shi'a

The first half of the twentieth century witnessed a gradual loss of religious fervour among the Shi'a of Iraq who were becoming increasingly receptive to the appeal of secular ideologies. By the 1950s, the penetration of communism into both the lay and clerical areas of Shi'i society was particularly profound.1 As a result, and also for reasons internal to the religious establishment itself, the clerical leadership living in the Iraqi shrine cities was increasingly disconnected from its community.