Introduction

Russia’s reinvasion of Ukraine in 2022 serves to confirm Russia’s increasing isolation from the West of which Japan is in many ways a part. For Russia there have always been two Asias, one represented by Japan, Western-leaning, and the other connected to Russia’s Eurasian space, China. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War necessitated a rethink of Russia’s Asia policy. Initially it was Japan that appeared as the “natural” partner, while China was dismissed as a developing country and former foe bent on territorial revisionism.

Later, relations with Japan were held hostage by the islands dispute, but also heavily constrained by Moscow’s tilt towards China. Yet the sluggish nature of Russia’s relations with Japan cannot be solely attributed to the China factor. Relations with China had a momentum of their own, rather than emanating solely from the parlous state of Russian relations with Japan. Nonetheless in the first decade of post-Soviet Russian foreign policy, and at times afterwards, Russia did attempt to play the “China card” vis-à-vis Japan.

While the strengthening of Russia-China relations is by now an inescapable fact, it does not fully explain the concomitant weakening of Russia-Japan relations. Certainly there were times when Moscow attempted to play the “China card” in its dealings with Japan. However other factors are also salient. I argue that the decreasing attention paid by Moscow to developing the Russian Far East (RFE) and the increasing importance of Central Asia in Sino-Russian relations has implied less of a role for Japan, as Russia’s pivot to Asia became ever more focused on Eurasia rather than Asia-Pacific.