The approach that we have seen Arendt taking in her major engagements in political theory, an approach which, at least from the point of view of the tradition that she seeks to oppose, is novel in the mediations that it displays, generates a question central to an understanding of her thought: the question of political ethics. The key issue here is whether and in what sense Arendt's political theory can incorporate an ethical component. It is commensurate with her anti-traditional approach that she does not appear to offer a political ethics of a conventional sort: she does not offer, that is, a set of precepts that can be applied to politics such as to guide the conduct and organisation of political life in the light of an image of the best kind of polity. We have seen that, for Arendt, the formulation and application of precepts like this reflects an inclination to legislate for politics from a vantage point outside it, seeking thereby an escape from, and the emasculation of, the inherently plural and conflictual sphere of politics. The aim of the tradition was to supply ‘standards and rules, yardsticks and measurements’ by which to resolve the contingency that, for Arendt, is the chief characteristic of the public realm (Arendt 1958: 102).

The prospect of resolving the argumentative and potentially anarchic business of politics by the application of moral principles, thought to be authoritative because they were beyond argument, has proved a false promise.