This chapter considers Hegel's treatment of the laws of thought from traditional logic: identity, noncontradiction, excluded middle, even perhaps the principle of sufficient reason (ground). It argues that these laws, which are uncritically presupposed by the tradition, are systematically derived by Hegel. Hegel is able to conduct this derivation because he grasps the deeper ontological import of these laws, that is the way in which the subject matter of logic (negation, affirmation, proposition and so on) can be traced back to a more primordial ontological foundation (nothingness, being, essence). I join others, like Priest, who consider Hegel a dialetheist, but supplement this view. I do so with an account of Hegel as responding to a different paradoxes than the ones that concern contemporary dialetheists. The paradox concerns the notion of identity, which can only relate what is already different. It was one noted by Russell and Wittgenstein after Hegel but not resolved by them in the same way he proposes.