Self-consciousness and the desire for recognition

Self-consciousness and practice

The claim of the preceding sections was that it was possible for there to be a form of self-sufficient knowledge – that is, some way of knowing things that did not depend on anything outside of some small circle of beliefs that were all either established non-inferentially or were established by making only the most meager of assumptions (such as the assumption that knowers speak a language). The three candidates for such knowledge, however, have been shown to be internally self-defeating; judged on the terms that they set for their own success, they fail to make good on their claims. Moreover, in tracing out the structure of this so-called self-contained knowledge, the proponents of this point of view find that in fact they are only tracing out the structure of “the understanding” itself – that is, they are not tracing out the structure of things but instead the structure of our own conceptualizing activities. Thus, the standpoint of “consciousness” is integrated into this new, more reflective conception of what counts as knowledge, which Hegel terms quite generally, “self-consciousness.” It is characterized by a reflection not on the structure of the things about which we are conscious, but on the structure of our conscious attendings and takings themselves.

In this new, reflective view, the goal of showing that what we take as authoritative really is so seems more readily achievable because the objects of reflection are our reflective activities themselves.