3 - Punishment
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 12 September 2012
Summary
Introduction
Amongst contemporary theorists, the most widespread interpretation of Hegel's theory of punishment is that it is a retributivist theory of annulment, where punishments cancel the performance of crimes. The theory is retributivist because it holds both that (a) criminals can be punished only if punishment is deserved and (b) the value of punishment must be proportional to the nature of its corresponding crime, rather than to any consequentialist considerations. Thus, Antony Duff says:
[Retributivism] justifies punishment in terms not of its contingently beneficial effects but of its intrinsic justice as a response to crime; the justificatory relationship holds between present punishment and past crime, not between present punishment and future effects.
Punishment is only given to persons responsible for committing crime. Therefore, the possession of criminal desert is both a necessary and sufficient condition for punishment. In addition, the value of this punishment is set in proportion to the value of the precipitating crime. Thus, retributivism can be understood as an individualistic theory because the only relevant factors pertain solely to the individual criminal himself. That is, the retributivist punishes in proportion to what this criminal deserves relating to the badness of his intentions in performing a past act. Factors beyond the criminal's intentions, such as any negative consequences of his crime or his lack of popularity amongst the public, are irrelevant to determine retributivist punishment.
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- Hegel's Political PhilosophyA Systematic Reading of the Philosophy of Right, pp. 39 - 51Publisher: Edinburgh University PressPrint publication year: 2009