4 - Historicizing the Philosophy of Science
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 16 February 2021
Summary
From Empiricism to Pragmatism
Popper's views on the growth and demarcation of scientific knowledge are attractive if not inspiring. His idea of science as a practice in which people consciously expose their work to criticism, and in which they strive for truth without ever pretending to actually possess it, has become a cherished ideal, if not self-image, for many scholars in the natural and social sciences, as well as in the humanities. Even more than the classical view or the logical empiricist model, Popper's view has become a ‘standard image of science’.
Various objections can be raised against Popper's position, however. These concern both the philosophical and the historical adequacy of his philosophy of science. The philosophical objections are shaped primarily by an at first sight rather esoteric doctrine, which has become known as the Duhem-Quine thesis; the most important criticism concerning the historical adequacy of Popper's views was formulated by the American historian and philosopher of science Thomas S. Kuhn (1922-1996). As Kuhn's insights can be conceived to some extent as an elaboration of the Duhem-Quine thesis, both lines of criticism in fact point to the same shortcomings.
The Duhem-Quine thesis has proved to be of monumental importance in intellectual history. If correct, it not only upsets Popper's philosophy of science but also has much broader philosophical implications. It undermines not only the distinction between metaphysical and empirical scientific statements, but also the distinctions between theory and observation and between logic and experience, in favour of a more pragmatist position, which only accepts such distinctions to the extent that they make a practical difference in and for our (scientific and other) activities. Clearly, a large number of fundamental presuppositions of mainstream Western philosophy are at stake here.
For everyday scientific practice, these principled objections do not immediately have far-reaching consequences. Theories with a wide empirical reach, a high degree of precision, and a simple structure remain preferable over theories lacking such qualities; and scientists who do not take criticism of their work seriously still risk placing themselves outside the scientific community. What is put at stake by this critique of Popper's philosophy of science is the interpretation of the results of scientific work. As we shall see below, it also brings out aspects of the development of science overlooked or ignored by Popper.
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- History and Philosophy of the HumanitiesAn Introduction, pp. 101 - 130Publisher: Amsterdam University PressPrint publication year: 2018