Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of maps
- List of illustrations
- List of tables
- List of figures
- Chronology
- Glossary
- A political who's who of modern Iran
- Preface
- Map 1 Iran and the Middle East
- Map 2 Iranian provinces
- Introduction
- 1 “Royal despots”: state and society under the Qajars
- 2 Reform, revolution, and the Great War
- 3 The iron fist of Reza Shah
- 4 The nationalist interregnum
- 5 Muhammad Reza Shah's White Revolution
- 6 The Islamic Republic
- Notes
- Bibliography
- Further reading
- Index
6 - The Islamic Republic
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of maps
- List of illustrations
- List of tables
- List of figures
- Chronology
- Glossary
- A political who's who of modern Iran
- Preface
- Map 1 Iran and the Middle East
- Map 2 Iranian provinces
- Introduction
- 1 “Royal despots”: state and society under the Qajars
- 2 Reform, revolution, and the Great War
- 3 The iron fist of Reza Shah
- 4 The nationalist interregnum
- 5 Muhammad Reza Shah's White Revolution
- 6 The Islamic Republic
- Notes
- Bibliography
- Further reading
- Index
Summary
Revolutions invariably produce stronger states.
De TocquevilleWe need to strengthen our state. Only Marxists want the state to wither away.
Hojjat al-Islam RafsanjaniTHE ISLAMIC REVOLUTION (1977–79)
There has been much speculation on whether the revolution could have been prevented if only this or that had been done: if the shah had been more resolute in crushing or reconciling the opposition; if he had not been suffering from cancer; if his forceful advisors had still been alive; if he had spent less on high-tech weaponry and more on crowd control gear; if his generals had shown a semblance of esprit de corps; if human rights organizations had not pestered him; if the CIA had continued to monitor the country closely after the 1950s; if the White House had ignored self-censoring diplomats and heeded the dire warning of skeptic academics; and if, in the final stages, Washington had been more consistent either in fully supporting him or in trying to reach out to Khomeini. Immediately after the debacle, Washington grappled with the question “Who lost Iran?” Some blamed President Carter, some the CIA, some the shah, some his generals. Such speculation, however, is as meaningless as whether the Titanic would have sunk if the deckchairs had been arranged differently.
The revolution erupted not because of this or that last-minute political mistake. It erupted like a volcano because of the overwhelming pressures that had built up over the decades deep in the bowels of Iranian society.
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- A History of Modern Iran , pp. 155 - 195Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2008