Introduction

Having tried to show why the otherness view of nature and the liberal view of politics should go together, I will finish in this final chapter by considering some objections to this way of being a “green liberal”. No doubt there are many objections that could be made to my arguments in this book. I will consider three specimen objections: one each from the domains of value theory, ethics and political theory, respectively.

First, consider an objection from the domain of value theory. The position I have argued for, and the otherness view of nature's value that it involves, presuppose that there is such a thing as non-instrumental value. But perhaps there isn't. If it could be shown that all value is really instrumental value this would undermine the whole project of this book. Not only has the proposition that all value is instrumental value been argued for recently by Wissenburg, but it has been argued for in the course of his book Green Liberalism, which contains a variety of important, carefully reasoned and often forceful arguments about the nature and viability of an environmentally friendly form of liberal political theory. It is therefore highly appropriate that I seek to defuse the “all value is instrumental value” objection by spending some time critically discussing Wissenburg's views on the matter.

Secondly, consider an objection in terms of ethical theory. Any satisfactory environmental ethic, capable of determining one course of action over another, cannot be grounded on a blanket ascription of noninstrumental value to all of nature.