1. To what degree is Taiwanese identity shaped and influenced by the rate of China's military modernization?

• a. To what degree is Taiwanese identity shaped and influenced by China's economic development?

• b. What implications does the change in the Beijing's capabilities have for political economy?

• c. For security?

2. How do these external factors (in Question 1) affect Taiwan's rate of democratization? Any specific examples?

3. Would cross-Strait economic and security policy be seen as constituency-driven or constituency-constrained?

4. What is the general public mood on cross-Strait relations?

• a. How will this mood determine the way presidential candidates present their policy towards Beijing?

5. How relevant is the ‘1992 Consensus’ as the basis for future developments in cross-Strait relations?

• a. How does the evolving Taiwanese identity affect the continued relevance of the ‘1992 Consensus?’

6. Do you agree that there seems to be a diverging trend in cross-Strait relations, where there is increasing economic integration and interdependence all the while political fragmentation remains persistent?

7. Looking ahead, how might a DPP-or a KMT-government strike deals with Beijing without upsetting their domestic constituencies?

8. What are some of the emerging results – benefits and costs – of the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA)?

9. Is the government ensuring that the agreement's benefits are more widely diffused to a broader spectrum of Taiwanese society (eg small and medium enterprises, labour unions, manufacturing and agriculture)?

• a. If so, how and if not, why not?

10. Have disadvantaged domestic constituents complicated the cross-Strait negotiation process?

11. What role might the United States play in the evolving situation in cross-Strait relations?

12. Under what conditions do you think the United States will more (or less) likely honour its security commitments under the Taiwan Relations Act?